



An Empirical-Juridical Review of Authority Coordination among BP Batam, the Indonesian National Armed Forces, and the Indonesian National Police in Securing Vital Objects in Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port

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Abstract: This study analyzes the coordination of authority among BP Batam, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and the Indonesian National Police (Polri) in securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port. The study is grounded in Batam's strategic position as an area that integrates industrial, commercial, transportation, investment, public service, and state asset management functions. It employs an empirical-juridical method using statutory, conceptual, and case study approaches. Data were obtained through regulatory review, institutional document analysis, and examination of security practices in the area. The findings show that BP Batam holds administrative authority to safeguard assets and strategic areas, Polri is responsible for public security and law enforcement, while TNI may provide support in specific situations within the national defense framework. The findings further indicate that the diversity of vital objects in Batam requires a risk-based security model rather than a uniform operational pattern. The main constraints include the absence of an optimal role matrix, limited integration of data on risk-prone points, insufficient standards for operational documentation, and underdeveloped inter-agency procedures. This study recommends strengthening integrated standard operating procedures, establishing a vital-object database, clarifying operational task allocation, and conducting periodic evaluations. Such a model is essential to ensure the lawfulness of action, institutional accountability, state asset protection, and the stability of Batam as a strategic area. Academically, this article extends state administrative law scholarship by positioning vital-object security as a problem of authority coordination that requires procedural certainty.

Keywords: Juridical Review, Authority, Coordination, Vital Object, POLRI, TNI, BP Batam

INTRODUCTION

The Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port occupies a strategic position in the national economic system because it functions as a hub for trade, investment, logistics, industry, and

the mobility of goods and people. Batam's proximity to Singapore and Malaysia makes the area not only economically significant, but also strategically sensitive from both legal and security perspectives. Industrial activities, ports, airports, logistics zones, public infrastructure, and state assets located within the working area of the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port Authority require a security system that is planned, coordinated, and grounded in clear legal authority. In this context, securing vital objects cannot be understood merely as a technical activity of protecting physical assets; rather, it constitutes part of state administrative law governance that ensures the continuity of public services, the protection of state assets, legal certainty, and investment stability.

Normatively, the administration of Free Trade Zones and Free Ports is governed, among others, by Government Regulation Number 41 of 2021. This regulation governs institutional arrangements, licensing services, asset development and utilization, facilities and incentives, area development, and sanctions in the administration of the Batam, Bintan, and Karimun areas. The regulatory framework was subsequently updated through Government Regulation Number 25 of 2025, which amended several provisions of Government Regulation Number 41 of 2021. This regulatory change indicates that the governance of free trade zones continues to adjust to the need to improve public services, strengthen the investment climate, and enhance the effectiveness of area management. Under such conditions, the security function becomes inseparable from area governance, since economic activity and strategic services can operate optimally only when vital objects, assets, environments, and supporting infrastructure remain secure, orderly, and protected.

As the governing authority for the area, BP Batam plays a significant role in managing, developing, and securing the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port. Within BP Batam's organizational structure, the Directorate of Asset Security is tasked with preparing matters related to environmental and forest-area protection, asset and vital-object security, and fire mitigation and response. This mandate shows that securing vital objects in Batam is not a stand-alone function, but is connected to asset protection, environmental protection, fire prevention, and the control of activities that may disrupt the functioning of the area. The Directorate of Asset Security therefore occupies a strategic position because it directly confronts field-level issues, ranging from spatial use that does not comply with regulations, illegal activities around strategic assets, risks of disruption to public facilities, and the need for cross-agency coordination in specific situations.

In principle, vital objects are objects that are essential to the lives of the public, state interests, sources of state revenue, or other strategic values. Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects emphasizes that the security of national vital objects is carried out to prevent and address threats and disturbances against strategic objects. Under this regulation, the Indonesian National Police plays an important role in securing national vital objects and, in certain circumstances, may request assistance from the Indonesian National Armed Forces in accordance with statutory provisions. This provision demonstrates that vital-object security operates within a space of inter-agency coordination, especially when the object being secured carries a high level of risk or is linked to national strategic interests.

Within the positive legal framework, Polri performs governmental functions in maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, and providing protection, guidance, and services to the public. Meanwhile, TNI performs the state defense function and may be involved in certain tasks within the framework of military operations other than war, in accordance with statutory provisions. At this point, the coordination of authority becomes a crucial issue: BP Batam has administrative authority over area and asset management, Polri holds authority in maintaining security and enforcing the law, while TNI may play a supporting role in security operations when there is a dimension of threat or a need to reinforce security

capacity. These three actors have different legal bases and mandates, yet in practice they may converge on the same object, namely the security of vital objects within Batam's strategic area.

The issue does not lie in whether each institution possesses authority, but in how those authorities are coordinated in practice. In state administrative law, authority must be exercised in accordance with the principles of legality, legal certainty, proportionality, accountability, and respect for statutory limits. However, in the practice of securing vital objects in Batam, the boundaries between administrative security, area control, maintenance of public order, and law enforcement often intersect. For example, when illegal activities occur around airports, ports, strategic installations, or BP Batam assets, security action cannot be effectively carried out by a single institution alone; it requires coordinated measures involving BP Batam, Polri, TNI, the local government, and the technical managers of the relevant objects.

This phenomenon can be seen in various security practices in Batam. One recent example is the control of illegal sand mining activities within the Aviation Operational Safety Area of Hang Nadim Airport, which involved the Directorate of Asset and Area Security of BP Batam together with elements of TNI and Polri. The activity was conducted to maintain orderly spatial use and ensure aviation safety within the airport area. This example shows that vital-object security is not limited to physical guarding, but is also connected to spatial planning, public safety, protection of state assets, and investment sustainability. Therefore, vital-object security must be analyzed from both a security perspective and an administrative law perspective, particularly with regard to the legal basis of authority, coordination mechanisms, operational procedures, and institutional accountability.

Theoretically, inter-agency coordination in securing vital objects can be read through the lens of collaborative governance. Ansell and Gash explain that collaborative governance emphasizes the involvement of multiple actors in collective decision-making processes to resolve public problems that cannot be handled by a single institution. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh likewise argue that collaborative governance operates through institutional interaction, shared capacity, and collective action directed toward achieving public goals. In the context of vital-object security in Batam, this approach is relevant because BP Batam, TNI, and Polri have different but mutually dependent roles. Nevertheless, the concept of collaboration must not blur the boundaries of legal authority. Effective collaboration should instead clarify who is authorized to do what, on what legal basis, through what procedures, and with what form of accountability.

Existing studies on BP Batam have largely focused on land management, land-use rights, licensing, investment, and area governance. By contrast, studies that specifically examine the coordination of authority among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri in securing vital objects remain relatively limited. This issue is important because vital-object security lies at the intersection of state administrative law, security law, state asset protection, and the governance of strategic areas. This research gap provides the basis for the present study, which offers an empirical-juridical analysis of authority coordination practices in securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port. This study does not only examine the legal norms that regulate each institution's authority, but also considers how those norms are implemented in field practice.

Based on the foregoing discussion, this study aims to analyze the coordination of authority among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri in securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port. The analysis focuses on three main aspects: the legal basis of each institution's authority, the forms of coordination in vital-object security practice, and the juridical and institutional constraints that arise in implementation. By adopting an empirical-juridical approach, this study is expected to contribute academically to the development of state administrative law scholarship and practically to the strengthening of vital-object security governance in strategic areas. Ultimately, legally coordinated vital-object security is important

not only for maintaining the security of the area, but also for strengthening legal certainty, state asset protection, public safety, and Batam's competitiveness as a free trade zone and free port.

METHODS

This study employs an empirical-juridical method with a socio-legal orientation. This method was selected because the study does not merely interpret legal norms governing the authority of BP Batam, TNI, and Polri, but also examines how such authority is exercised in the practice of securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port. In legal research, doctrinal analysis is necessary to understand the structure of norms, principles, and the legal basis of authority, while an empirical approach is required to observe how law operates within institutional and social practice. Accordingly, this study positions law not only as a regulatory text, but also as a governance instrument that operates through actors, procedures, coordination, and administrative action.

The research uses statutory, conceptual, and case study approaches. The statutory approach is used to examine the legal basis of BP Batam's authority in area and asset management, Polri's authority in maintaining public security and order, and TNI's role in providing security support in accordance with statutory provisions. The conceptual approach is used to explain the concepts of authority, institutional coordination, vital objects, state administrative law, and collaborative governance. Meanwhile, the case study approach is used to understand the practice of vital-object security in Batam as a legal phenomenon occurring within a specific institutional setting. A case study is relevant because this research seeks to answer how authority coordination takes place and why certain constraints emerge in its implementation.

The research location is the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port, with a focus on coordination among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri in securing vital objects. Batam was selected because of its strategic position as a center of industry, trade, ports, airports, investment, and state asset management. This complexity makes Batam an appropriate site for examining the intersection between administrative authority, security functions, and the need to protect vital objects.

The data consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with informants who had knowledge, experience, or direct involvement in securing vital objects. Informants included representatives of BP Batam, particularly units related to asset and vital-object security, as well as elements of TNI, Polri, and other relevant parties. Semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to maintain the focus of inquiry while allowing informants to explain their experiences, coordination practices, constraints, and institutional perceptions in greater depth. Secondary data were derived from laws and regulations, official institutional documents, activity reports, legal literature, journal articles, methodology books, and other academic sources supporting the analysis.

Table 1. Research Method Design

Component	Description
Type of research	Empirical-juridical research with a socio-legal orientation
Approaches	Statutory, conceptual, and case study approaches
Location	Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port
Research focus	Coordination of authority among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri
Object of study	Security of vital objects in the area
Primary data	Interviews with representatives of BP Batam, TNI, Polri, and related parties
Secondary data	Regulations, official documents, legal literature, journals, and institutional reports
Data collection	Document study, semi-structured interviews, and limited observation
Analytical technique	Qualitative analysis through data reduction, categorization, legal interpretation, and conclusion drawing

Data validity	Source triangulation, technique triangulation, and consistency checking of findings
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Data collection was conducted through document study, semi-structured interviews, and limited observation. Document study was used to examine legal materials and institutional documents relating to the legal basis of authority, coordination mechanisms, and the implementation of vital-object security. Document analysis is important because legal and institutional documents show how authority is formulated, limited, and operationalized in practice. Interviews were conducted to obtain empirical understanding of coordination forms, role allocation, communication procedures, and constraints in security operations. Observation was carried out by examining institutional and security practices that were reasonably accessible to the researcher.

The analysis was conducted qualitatively and descriptively. Data were reduced to select information relevant to the research questions. The data were then categorized into several major themes, namely the legal basis of authority, forms of coordination, institutional roles, juridical constraints, and operational constraints. The categorization process helped the researcher organize field data systematically before connecting them with the applicable legal norms. The subsequent stage involved legal interpretation, namely assessing the conformity of coordination practices with the principles of legality, legal certainty, accountability, proportionality, and effectiveness. The analysis was not merely descriptive, but was directed at assessing whether the coordination of authority had been implemented in accordance with the framework of state administrative law.

Data validity was maintained through source and technique triangulation. Source triangulation was conducted by comparing information from BP Batam, TNI, Polri, official documents, and legal literature. Technique triangulation was carried out by comparing interview findings, document study, and limited observation. In addition, the study examined the consistency of informant statements, document contents, and relevant legal provisions. In qualitative research, data validity depends not only on the number of informants, but also on the credibility, consistency, and traceability of the analytical process.

This research provides a comprehensive description of the coordination of authority among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri in securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port. The findings map the legal basis of each institution, explain the existing coordination patterns, identify constraints, and formulate recommendations for institutional coordination. The study therefore contributes to the development of state administrative law scholarship and provides input for strengthening vital-object security governance in strategic areas.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The findings indicate that securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port operates within a sphere of overlapping, yet non-identical, authority. BP Batam functions as the manager of the area, assets, and strategic facilities; Polri carries out functions related to security, public order, and law enforcement; while TNI is involved in providing security support within the framework of national defense and military operations other than war. The intersection of these authorities is significant because Batam is not merely an economic-administrative space, but a strategic area comprising ports, airports, industrial estates, land assets, forest environments, and public service installations. Therefore, security coordination should not be understood as informal assistance between agencies, but as a legal mechanism to ensure that every action has a clear basis of authority, role allocation, procedure, and accountability.

Table 2. Mapping of Actors' Authority in Vital-Object Security

Actor	Legal Basis of Authority	Main Role	Limits of Authority
BP Batam / Directorate of Asset Security	Government Regulation 41/2021 in conjunction with Government Regulation 25/2025; duties and functions of the Directorate of Asset Security	Securing assets, vital objects, the environment and forest areas, and fire mitigation	Administrative and operational authority, not criminal law-enforcement authority
Polri	Law 2/2002; Presidential Decree 63/2004; Police regulations concerning vital objects	Public security and order, law enforcement, and security assistance for vital objects	Based on legal procedures and police authority
TNI	Law 34/2004 in conjunction with Law 3/2025; Law 3/2002	Security support in strategic and defense contexts	Involvement must follow the assistance framework and defense regulations
Local government / Satpol PP	Regulations on public order and regional government	Support for area control and territorial supervision	Limited to regional governmental authority

Institutionally, the Directorate of Asset Security of BP Batam has a mandate directly related to environmental and forest-area protection, asset and vital-object security, and fire mitigation and response. This mandate is fundamental because it is administrative and operational in nature. It means that the Directorate may conduct patrols, supervision, mapping of risk-prone points, physical security, and initial control measures against disturbances in the area. However, when a disturbance develops into an alleged criminal offense, a threat to public safety, or a potential open conflict, this authority must be connected to Polri and, under certain circumstances, may involve TNI. This framework is consistent with Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004, which positions the security of national vital objects as a strategic matter, and with Police regulations on the provision of security assistance for national vital objects and certain objects.

Table 3. Typology of Vital Objects and Security Risks in Batam

Type of Object/Area	Main Risk	Coordination Requirement
Airport and Aviation Operational Safety Area	Illegal mining, disruption to aviation safety, unauthorized access	BP Batam, airport operator, TNI, and Polri
Ports/logistics areas	Disruption to goods movement, smuggling, and illegal access	BP Batam, Polri, Customs, and port authorities
BP Batam land assets	Unauthorized occupation, competing claims, and non-compliant utilization	BP Batam, Polri, local government/Satpol PP
Industrial estates	Production disruption, asset theft, and land conflict	BP Batam, Polri, and estate managers
Forests/environmental areas	Land clearing, fires, and environmental degradation	BP Batam, local government, Polri, and environmental agencies

The next finding shows that vital objects in Batam have different risk characteristics. Airports and aviation operational safety areas require security based on transportation safety, while ports and logistics zones require access control and supervision of goods movement. BP Batam land assets present different challenges because they often intersect with unauthorized occupation, utilization claims, or informal economic activities. Forest and environmental areas face risks of land clearing, fire, and ecological damage. Meanwhile, investment zones require security guarantees so that production activities are not disrupted. This variation shows that a single security model cannot be uniformly applied. Each object requires a specific combination of administrative, security, spatial planning, public safety, and law-enforcement approaches.

Table 4. Forms of Coordination in Vital-Object Security

Coordination Stage	Form of Activity	Concrete Output
Preventive	Mapping of risk-prone points, patrols, information exchange	Risk data and supervision schedules
Operational	Deployment of joint personnel and site security	Controlled locations and secured access
Control/enforcement	Termination of illegal activities, access closure, area sterilization	Illegal activities stopped
Post-action	Repeat monitoring, documentation, evaluation	Prevention of recurring violations
Evaluative	Cross-agency meetings and SOP recommendations	Improvement of coordination governance

Another finding concerns the importance of distinguishing between formally designated vital objects and strategic area assets that functionally require a high level of protection. In Batam's practice, not all assets or strategic spaces are formally classified as national vital objects, although some perform functions that determine investment continuity, mobility, public services, and public safety. This difference in status affects the legal basis of action, the form of security measures, and the actors involved.

When an object is categorized as a national vital object or a certain object, the pattern of police security assistance can be formulated more easily through existing mechanisms. Conversely, when an object remains categorized as an area asset or an administrative risk point, BP Batam must strengthen its database, priority setting, and initial coordination so that security action does not wait for a disturbance to escalate. This is where the empirical-juridical approach becomes relevant, because the study does not stop at asking whether authority exists, but also assesses whether such authority can be used effectively in different field situations.

In practice, coordination among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri moves through three main stages. First, preventive coordination is carried out through mapping risk-prone points, patrols, information exchange, and periodic supervision. Second, operational coordination takes place when there is a need to deploy cross-agency personnel, for example in securing strategic assets or controlling illegal activities. Third, post-action coordination is conducted through follow-up monitoring, documentation, evaluation, and prevention of recurring violations.

BP Batam's 2025 program indicates the existence of patrol security activities, control of illegal activities, handling of forest and land fires, security services for vital-object assets, technical guidance on vital-object security, and joint inter-agency activities. These data confirm that security coordination has entered institutional planning, although its effectiveness still needs to be tested through field practice.

Table 5. Security Case in the Aviation Operational Safety Area of Hang Nadim Airport

Aspect	Concrete Finding	Legal Implication
Object	Aviation Operational Safety Area of Hang Nadim Airport	Concerns public safety and a strategic object
Disturbance	Illegal sand mining and unauthorized access	Intersects with spatial planning, environmental protection, and aviation safety
Actors	Directorate of Asset Security of BP Batam, TNI, Polri, and related elements	Shows a pattern of cross-authority coordination
Action	Control measures, access closure, and personnel deployment	Requires a legal basis and documentation
Follow-up risk	Recurring violations after operations	Requires monitoring and post-control SOPs

The case of controlling illegal sand mining activities around the Aviation Operational Safety Area of Hang Nadim Airport is particularly important. It shows that disturbances to vital objects do not always take the form of direct security attacks, but may involve spatial

utilization that endangers aviation safety and disrupts area functions. A 2026 report noted that the control operation was conducted by a joint team involving the Directorate of Asset Security of BP Batam, TNI, Polri, and other parties. From the perspective of administrative law, this case demonstrates the need for swift action. However, swift action must still be supported by a clear legal basis, official minutes, site documentation, land-status mapping, and follow-up measures. Without these documents, an operation may be physically completed but still leave legal vulnerabilities and the potential for recurring violations.

The main constraint identified is the absence of a fully integrated coordination system beginning at the prevention stage. Coordination often appears strong once a case emerges, but it is not always visible as a daily system based on risk data. In addition, the boundaries between administrative action, security measures, and law enforcement may become blurred in the absence of operational cross-agency guidelines.

BP Batam requires a legal basis to secure assets; Polri requires a legal basis to take law-enforcement measures; while the involvement of TNI must be placed within a proportional support framework that complies with regulations. In dynamic field situations, even minor ambiguity may generate divergent interpretations, slow responses, or weaken the accountability of action.

Table 6. Constraints and Model for Strengthening Coordination

Constraint	Impact	Required Strengthening
The boundaries of authority are not always understood uniformly	Slow or divergent responses among agencies	Cross-agency authority matrix
Vital-object data are not yet integrated	Security priorities become inconsistent	Vital-object and risk-prone-point database
Coordination tends to be case-based	Reactive security practices	Periodic patrols and evaluation
Cross-agency SOPs are not yet robust	Potential divergence in field actions	SOPs before, during, and after operations
Operational documentation is not standardized	Difficult legal follow-up	Minutes, photographs, videos, chronology, and personnel list

Based on these findings, a model for strengthening coordination should be directed toward five components. First, authority mapping must clarify the roles of BP Batam, Polri, TNI, local government, and vital-object managers. Second, a vital-object database should contain asset status, risk levels, disturbance history, and responsible actors. Third, cross-agency SOPs should regulate the stages before, during, and after operations. Fourth, legal documentation should include photographs, videos, minutes, chronology, and personnel records. Fifth, periodic evaluation should shift work patterns from reactive to preventive.

With this model, vital-object security in Batam would not merely be a technical guarding activity, but also a legal governance instrument that supports legal certainty, public safety, state asset protection, and the area's competitiveness. Thus, the findings indicate the need to construct a more formal coordination architecture. Such formalization is not intended to restrict field flexibility, but to ensure that every operation has a legal basis, measurable indicators of success, and a mechanism open to evaluation. This is essential so that security outcomes are not only swift, but also lawful, proportionate, and institutionally sustainable.

The findings show that the main problem in securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port does not lie in the absence of authority, but in how that authority is coordinated in a lawful, proportionate, and accountable manner. BP Batam has an administrative mandate in managing the area, assets, and strategic objects, while Polri performs functions related to security, public order, and law enforcement. TNI, on the other hand, is involved in providing security support in accordance with the national defense framework and the provisions governing military operations other than war. Accordingly, securing vital

objects in Batam must be positioned as a practice of administrative law that intersects with state security functions, rather than merely as a technical field-security activity.

From the perspective of state administrative law, authority always requires a legal basis, limits of action, procedures, and accountability. This is crucial because BP Batam operates in an area with a special status as a Free Trade Zone and Free Port. This status provides broad administrative authority in asset management, licensing services, area development, and investment strengthening. However, broad authority does not mean that every form of security action can be undertaken unilaterally by BP Batam. When area disturbances involve alleged criminal offenses, potential conflict, public safety, or threats to strategic objects, the functions of Polri and the support of TNI become unavoidable coordination requirements.

The coordination of authority in this context should be understood as a mechanism to prevent two risks at once. The first is an authority vacuum, namely a condition in which a vital object faces a threat but no institution takes immediate action because it is waiting for another institution to act. The second is overlapping authority, namely a situation in which several institutions act on the same object without clear role allocation. Both risks may weaken legal certainty and security effectiveness. Therefore, coordination among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri must be developed not only through informal communication, but also through institutional procedures that are measurable, documented, and open to evaluation.

The finding regarding the diversity of vital objects in Batam also shows that security approaches cannot be standardized. Airports, ports, industrial estates, land assets, forest areas, and public service facilities have different risk characteristics. Airports and flight operation safety areas, for example, are directly linked to transportation safety and airspace protection. BP Batam land assets often intersect with land administration, utilization claims, and potential conflict. Forest and environmental areas present risks of land clearing and ecological damage. These different characteristics show that vital-object security requires a risk-based approach, rather than a routine guarding approach.

In this regard, the mandate of the Directorate of Asset Security of BP Batam provides an important entry point. The tasks of securing the environment and forests, assets and vital objects, and fire mitigation demonstrate that the Directorate does not merely guard assets physically, but also performs early detection, disturbance prevention, and area risk control. Nevertheless, this mandate needs to be strengthened by clear coordination instruments. Without an authority matrix, a vital-object database, and cross-agency SOPs, security implementation may depend on work habits, personal relations among agencies, or ad hoc responses after disturbances have already occurred.

The concept of collaborative governance helps explain this need. Ansell and Gash emphasize that collaborative governance operates when public actors engage in a joint process to resolve problems that cannot be handled by a single institution. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh also argue that institutional collaboration requires shared capacity, actor engagement, and collective action directed toward public goals. In the Batam context, these public goals include state asset protection, public safety, legal certainty, investment continuity, and the sustainable functioning of the strategic area. However, collaboration must not be understood as a blending of authority. On the contrary, sound collaboration must clarify who does what, on what legal basis, in what situation, and with what form of accountability.

This discussion also highlights the importance of distinguishing between administrative security and law enforcement. BP Batam may conduct patrols, supervision, mapping of risk-prone points, physical security, and initial control measures over assets or areas under its authority. However, when criminal elements, violence, destruction, or threats to public order are found, Polri assumes a dominant role because police functions are attached to the maintenance of security and law enforcement. Meanwhile, the involvement of TNI must be carefully positioned within a security support framework, especially when the object being

secured has a strategic dimension or relates to national defense interests. This division is important to prevent mandate ambiguity in the field.

The control of illegal sand mining activities around the Aviation Operational Safety Area of Hang Nadim Airport provides an example that disturbances to vital objects do not always appear as conventional security threats. Illegal activities around strategic areas may endanger aviation safety, cause environmental damage, threaten spatial order, and undermine the authority of area management. Therefore, security action should not be assessed only by whether a location has been sterilized. More important measures are whether the action has a legal basis, whether the procedure is clear, whether the documentation is complete, and whether follow-up measures exist after the operation to prevent recurrence.

Methodologically, the findings reinforce the importance of an empirical-juridical approach. Doctrinal analysis is necessary to examine norms of authority and limits of action, while empirical data are required to understand how coordination works in institutional practice. The case study approach is also relevant because vital-object security in Batam does not occur in an abstract space, but in concrete situations involving actors, locations, risks, documents, and specific procedures. Thus, legal analysis should not stop at interpreting regulations, but should move toward evaluating whether legal norms are capable of effectively guiding institutional action.

Future coordination strengthening should be directed to five agendas. First, an authority matrix should be prepared to explain the roles of BP Batam, Polri, TNI, local government, and vital-object managers. Second, an integrated database should be developed to record vital objects, asset status, risk-prone points, disturbance history, and risk levels. Third, cross-agency SOPs should be formulated to regulate the stages before, during, and after security operations. Fourth, legal documentation should be standardized in the form of minutes, photographs, videos, chronology, personnel lists, and the legal basis of action. Fifth, periodic evaluation should be institutionalized so that coordination is not merely reactive, but preventive and grounded in institutional learning.

Thus, the discussion confirms that securing vital objects in Batam must be positioned as part of strategic-area governance. Good security does not merely protect objects from physical disturbance; it also preserves the legitimacy of government action, prevents conflicts of authority, protects state assets, and supports investment certainty. Coordination among BP Batam, TNI, and Polri will be effective when built upon legality, clear role allocation, accurate risk data, and verifiable accountability mechanisms. Without these foundations, vital-object security risks becoming a temporary response to disturbances rather than an institutional system capable of sustaining Batam's function as a free trade zone and free port.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study confirms that securing vital objects within the Batam Free Trade Zone and Free Port requires more structured governance of authority because the area contains economic, transportation, industrial, public service, and state asset management functions. BP Batam does not only act as the administrative manager of the area, but also as an institution with initial responsibility for maintaining the order, functionality, and security of strategic assets. However, this mandate has limits when field problems enter the realm of public order, law enforcement, or defense support. At this point, the involvement of Polri and TNI becomes relevant, not as institutions that take over BP Batam's authority, but as institutional partners operating within their respective functional frameworks.

The findings show that the relationship among BP Batam, Polri, and TNI needs to be built through a coordination pattern grounded in legality, rather than merely through work habits or situational communication. BP Batam has administrative authority to act in securing assets, vital objects, the environment, and the area. Polri performs security, public order, and

law-enforcement functions when violations or potential criminal offenses arise. TNI may provide support in certain situations as long as it complies with the national defense framework and statutory provisions. This division is important so that every security action has a clear, proportional, and accountable basis.

This study also finds that vital objects in Batam have different risk characteristics. Airports and aviation safety areas relate to transportation safety; ports and logistics areas relate to goods movement and access control; land assets relate to utilization claims and potential conflict; while forest and environmental areas present threats of land clearing, fire, and ecological damage. This diversity shows that security cannot be carried out through a single pattern. Each object requires an approach adapted to the type of threat, legal status, managing actor, and possible impact.

The identified challenge is the insufficient optimization of coordination instruments capable of bridging the different mandates among institutions. The absence of a detailed authority matrix, the lack of integrated data on vital objects and risk-prone points, and weak operational standards reduce field effectiveness. In addition, coordination that depends too heavily on case responses may render security practices reactive. A strategic area such as Batam requires a system capable of detecting risks early, regulating cross-institutional responses, and ensuring follow-up after operations are carried out.

Based on these findings, this study recommends five strengthening agendas. First, an integrated SOP should be prepared to regulate the stages of prevention, operation implementation, control measures, and evaluation. Second, a risk-based vital-object database should be developed. Third, a role matrix should be formulated for BP Batam, Polri, TNI, local government, and object managers. Fourth, legal documentation should be standardized in the form of minutes, chronology, photographs, videos, and personnel lists. Fifth, periodic evaluation should be conducted to ensure that the security pattern evolves into an institutional system that is preventive, adaptive, and accountable. Thus, the coordination of authority in securing vital objects in Batam should be directed toward a governance model that is legally valid, operationally effective, and institutionally sustainable. The main contribution of this study lies in its assertion that area security cannot be separated from the design of administrative authority. Strong security is determined not only by the number of personnel, but also by clarity of mandate, data quality, procedural compliance, and the ability of institutions to work within a unified system of action that can withstand legal scrutiny.

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